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Penalty on Early IRA Withdrawals
-by Neil E. Harl* 
Since their authorization in 1974, individual retirement accounts have enjoyed astounding 

growth. In total, IRAs have more than $3 trillion in assets and are held by more than 45 

percent of U.S. households.1 Roughly 26 percent of the $11.6 trillion U.S. retirement asset 

market is held in individual retirement accounts.2 Assets held in IRAs have increased 13 

percent per year since 1990.3

As is well known, contributions are deductible within limits ($4,000 in 20054 with 
additional “catch-up” contributions by those age 50 and older5). And, growth in the fund 
is tax-free until funds are withdrawn. However, a veritable flood of cases and rulings in 
recent months has focused attention on the tax consequences of early withdrawal.6 
General rule 
Distributions to the owner of a traditional IRA generally must begin no later than April 1 
following the calendar year in which the owner reaches age 70 ½.7 However, distributions 
can be delayed beyond 70 ½ until April 1 of the calendar year after an employee retires if 
the employee is not a “five percent” owner.8 A “five percent” owner is defined as someone 
who owns more than five percent of the total combined voting power or the capital or 
profits interest of the employer.9 
Distributions from a traditional IRA to a participant before that individual reaches age 
59 ½ are generally subject to the same 10 percent penalty10 (plus regular income tax, of 
course) that apply to early distributions from other types of qualified plans. However, there 
are numerous exceptions – and that’s where taxpayers have often run into problems. 
First, a distribution on or after the death of a participant is not subject to the 10 percent 
penalty.11 Moreover, a distribution because of disability of the participant is not subject to 
the penalty.12 
Distributions made for an employee after separation from service after reaching age 
55 are not subject to the penalty for qualified plans13 but that exception does not apply to 
IRAs.14 
Distributions for higher education expenses incurred in the taxable year of the distribution

are not subject to the 10 percent penalty.15 The expenses can be incurred for the individual, 

the individual’s spouse, child or grandchild of the individual or the individual’s spouse.16

A case decided on July 5, 2005, by the Tax Court held that IRA distributions used to pay 

education expenses incurred in the year before the distribution were subject to the 10 

percent additional tax.17 And a Tax Court case decided on July 19, 2005, pointed out that
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an IRA distribution used to pay qualified higher education 
expenses in the year after the distribution was subject to the 
10 percent penalty.18 
Limited distributions for first time home purchases are an 
exception from the penalty.19 To be considered a first time home 
buyer, the individual (and spouse if the individual is married) 
must not have had an ownership interest in a principal residence 
during the two-year period ending on the date the new home 
is acquired.20 Qualified expenses include acquisition costs, 
settlement charges and closing costs.21 The residence may be 
for the individual or the individual’s spouse, child, grandchild 
or ancestor of the individual or the individual’s spouse.22 Only
$10,000 during the individual’s lifetime may be withdrawn 
without a penalty for this purpose.23 
Distributions to unemployed individuals for health insurance 
premiums are not subject to the 10 percent penalty.24 That’s if 
the individual has received unemployment compensation for 
12 consecutive weeks under any federal or state unemployment 
compensation law and the distributions are made during during 
the year unemployment compensation is paid or the succeeding 
taxable year and the distributions do not exceed the amount paid 
for insurance.25 
Distributions for expenses paid for medical care are an 
exception to the 10 percent penalty, also.26 That’s to the extent 
the distributions do not exceed the medical deduction.27 
There’s also an exception for distributions which are part 
of a series of substantially equal periodic payments (not less 
frequently than annually) made for the life (or life expectancy) 
of the individual or the joint lives of the individual and the 
designated beneficiary.28 If it involves a qualified plan, the 
exception does not apply until the individual separates from 
service.29 The major issue is whether the individual can 
continue to work in some capacity for the employer. Generally, 
the individual must change status (from an employee to an 
independent contractor, for example), and render services on 
an irregular basis although in some cases a shift in status alone 
has not been sufficient.30 
There’s an exception from the 10 percent penalty for payments 
under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order but that does not 
apply to IRAs.31 
Other situations 
In one recent case, the court said bankruptcy filing did not 
excuse an early withdrawal.32 The bankruptcy estate apparently 
takes over the debtor’s age and thus is liable for the premature 
distribution penalty.33 In a 2004 case, withdrawal because of 
economic hardship and to avoid foreclosure on the home were 
not considered exceptions and the 10 percent penalty was 
imposed.34 
A 2003 case involved an involuntary distribution from the 
account as a result of an IRS levy.35 The amount involved was 
included in income of the recipient but the 10 percent penalty 
for early withdrawal was not assessed.36 
In conclusion 
Any distribution before age 59 ½ should be planned very 
carefully. Most of the cases thus far have involved situations 
where the decision to withdraw apparently was made without 
much tax advice and counsel. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 2005. See 
Investment Company Institute, “Frequently Asked Questions 
About Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),” March, 
2005. 
2 Id 
3 Id.

4 I.R.C. § 219(b)(5).

5 I.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(B) ($500 for 2005).

6 See, e.g., notes 17 -18 infra.

7 I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(C).

8 Id.

9 I.R.C. § 416(i)(1)(B)(I –this is a lower case eye).

10 I.R.C. § 72(t).

11 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(ii).

12 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii).

13 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(v).

14 I.R.C. § 72(t)(3).

15 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E). See Gorski v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary 

Opinion 2005-112 (expenditures for computer, housewares, 
furniture, appliances and bedding were not qualified expenses 
for purposes of 10 percent additional tax on IRA distribution; 
expense for course books not excludible because not 
substantiated). 
16 I.R.C. § 72(t)(7)(A). 
17 Lodder-Beckert v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2005-162. 
18 Ambata v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2005-93. 
19 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(F). 
20 I.R.C. § 72(t)(8)(D)(i). 
21 I.R.C. § 72(t)(8)(C). 
22 I.R.C. § 72(t)(8)(A). 
23 I.R.C. § 72(t)(8)(B). 
24 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(D). 
25 Id. 
26 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(B). 
27 Id. 
28 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(iv). 
29 I.R.C. § 72(t)(3)(B). 
30 Rev. Rul. 69-647, 1969-2 C.B. 101 (senior executive who 
retired from full-time employment and continued to render 
services on a part-time basis as consultant was considered to 
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have separated from employment). See Reinhardt v. Comm’r, 85 
T.C. 511 (1985) (employee-shareholder who sold equity interest 
in corporation and changed from employee to independent 
contractor but continued to perform same services did not 
“separate from service”); Bolden v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 829 (1963) 
(no separation from service for former shareholder-employee 
who continued after sale of equity interest in advisory capacity); 
Ridenour v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 128 (1983) (individual who 
continues to provide services has not separated from service 
even though status may have changed); Rev. Rul. 81-26, 1981-
1 C.B. 200 (employee who became partner not separated from 
employment). 
31 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(c), (3)(A). 
32 Williams v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004-57. 
33 In re Kochell, 804 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1986). 
34 Vulie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-51. 
35 Palermino v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2003-45. 
36 Id. 
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
ADvERSE POSSESSION 
HOSTILE POSSESSION. The disputed land was on the 
plaintiff’s side of a fence which was located on the defendant’s 
property. The surveys showed the defendant’s land to extend 
past the fence by about 15 feet. The plaintiff claimed title to 
the disputed land by adverse possession, claiming to have 
used the disputed strip for some crops, for a walking path, and 
for a road. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s use was 
occasional and not sufficiently hostile to cause title to pass by 
adverse possession. The trial court held for the defendant and 
the appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence, at best, 
showed only occasional use of the disputed land by the plaintiff 
and no actions which would necessarily put the defendant on 
notice that the plaintiff was using the land as the plaintiff’s own. 
The court noted, for example, that the “road” was little more 
than a path and showed no signs of tire marks or ruts. Groves 
v. Applen, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1460 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2005). 
BANkRuPTCy 
GENERAL

EXEMPTIONS.

HOMESTEAD. The debtors, husband and wife, used the 
proceeds of nonexempt assets to prepay for the construction 
of an addition to their residence. The construction contract 
was entered into and the deposit paid for the entire cost of the 
construction after a judgment was entered against the debtors 
but before an involuntary Chapter 7 case was filed against the 
debtors. The judgment creditors sought to recover the deposit 
payment and the debtors sought to include the deposit in the 
homestead exemption. Construction commenced soon after the 
bankruptcy petition was filed but before the order for relief was 
issued. The court held that, upon the signing of the contract and 
payment of the construction costs, the payment was equitably 
converted into part of the residence and became eligible for part 
of the residence exemption. In re Hodes, 402 F.3d 1005 (10th 
Cir. 2005), aff’g, 287 B.R. 561 (D. kan. 2002). 
IRA. The debtor was divorced and the divorce decree provided 
for alimony payments to the debtor’s spouse. The divorce decree 
also provided that the alimony payments were secured by the 
debtor’s interest in an employee retirement account. The debtor 
failed to make the alimony payments and the former spouse sued 
to enforce the divorce decree against the retirement account. The 
debtor filed for bankruptcy and claimed the retirement account 
as exempt and the security interest as void as against an anti-
assignment statute. The court held that the retirement account 
was not governed by the anti-assignment provision under Texas 
law which exempted alimony. In addition, the court held that 
the divorce decree security interest was deemed a distribution 
at the time of the decree, removing the pledged funds from the 
retirement account. Therefore, the pledged funds were not eligible 
for the retirement funds exemption. In re Coppola, 2005-2 u.S. 
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,503 (5th Cir. 2005).
 CHAPTER 12

ELIGIBILITy. The debtors had borrowed operating funds 

from a Farm Credit Services bank for their mint farm but 

defaulted on the loan and had to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In that 
bankruptcy case, the debtors received a discharge of unsecured 
loans, including the portion of the bank loan above the value of 
the farm. After the loan default, the debtors leased the farmland 
under cash and share leases. The leases required the debtors to 
maintain irrigation equipment, often on a daily basis. The debtors 
filed another Chapter 12 case and the bank objected to the debtors’
eligibility for Chapter 12 because (1) the debtor’s debts exceeded 
the $1.5 million limit and (2) the debtors were not engaged in 
farming. The bank argued that the full amount of the unpaid loan 
should be included in the debtor’s debts, not just the portion 
secured by the fair market value of the farm. The court held that 
the unsecured portion of the loan was discharged in the previous 
Chapter 7 case and was no longer a personal obligation of the 
debtors; therefore, the unsecured portion discharged in the Chapter 
7 case was not included in the debts for purposes of eligibility for 
Chapter 12. The court also held that the debtors were engaged 
in farming because most of the leases were sharecrop leases and 
the debtors were required to maintain a substantial involvement 
